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NO WITNESS, NO CASE:  
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONDUCT 
AND QUALITY OF ICC INVESTIGATIONS 
Dermot Groome* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Prosecution’s conduct of investigations has come under 
increasing scrutiny and criticism from judges on the International 
Criminal Court. Criticisms are directed at some of the investigative 
methods used as well as the quality of some of the evidence 
presented at proceedings. 
To date, the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”, “the 
Prosecutor”, “the Prosecution”) has completed investigations into 
seven situations resulting in requests for 30 arrest warrants or 
summonses.1 The charges against 15 accused have been the subject 
of confirmation proceedings pursuant to Article 61 of the Rome 
Statute. Judges have confirmed the charges against ten individuals 
                                                 
 * Dermot Groome, Senior Trial Attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Distinguished Fellow of International Criminal Justice at the Dickinson School of 
Law, Pennsylvania State University. He currently leads the prosecution of the case 
against Ratko Mladić. He is the author of The Handbook of Human Rights 
Investigation (2d ed. 2011) and teaches at the Institute of International Criminal 
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reflect the official position of the United Nations. The author is grateful to Grace 
Harbour, Ruben Karemaker, Guénaël Mettraux, Milbert Shin, and Alex Whiting for 
their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
1 Under Article 58 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecution can request 
either an arrest warrant or a summons to appear. Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court art. 58, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544, 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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and have declined against four on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence.2 In one case, the confirmation hearing was adjourned for 
additional investigation after the Chamber found the evidence 
presented was insufficient to sustain the charges.3 The inability to 
sustain any of the charges at the standard required for confirmation 
in itself indicates infirmities in the investigation.4 Of the ten 
confirmed cases, one accused has been acquitted after trial and the 
Prosecution withdrew charges against another citing the loss of 
several witnesses.5 Recently, the Prosecution notified the Kenyatta 
Chamber that it was removing a key witness from its case after 
                                                 
2 Accused against whom charges have been confirmed: Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC): Lubanga (1/29/2007); Katanga and Chui (9/30/2008); 
Sudan: Abakaer Nourain and Jerbo Jamus (3/7/2011); Central African Republic 
(CAR): Bemba (6/15/2009); Kenya: Ruto, Sang, Kenyatta, and Muthaura 
(1/23/2012). On March 18, 2013 the Prosecution withdrew the charges against 
Muthaura. Ngudjolo Chui was acquitted after trial. Chambers declined to confirm 
the charges against the following accused: DRC: Mbarushimana (2/16/2011); 
Sudan: Abu Garda (2/8/2010); Kenya: Kosgey, Hussein Ali (1/23/2012).  
3 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision 
Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599831.pdf [hereinafter Gbagbo Adjournment Decision]. 
The Chamber directed the Prosecution to file an amended Document Containing 
the Charges (“DCC”) by November 15, 2013 with resumption of the confirmation 
hearing to follow. 
4 The legal standard of sufficiency for the issuance of an arrest warrant is 
“reasonable grounds” that a crime under the Rome Statute has been committed. 
The standard for confirmation of the charges is “substantial grounds to believe,” 
something more than reasonable grounds but less than “proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” In Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber explicated this standard as requiring the 
Prosecutor to “offer concrete and tangible proof demonstrating a clear line of 
reasoning underpinning its specific allegations” against an accused. The Chamber 
must “[a]fter an exacting scrutiny of all the evidence, . . .determine whether it is 
thoroughly satisfied that the Prosecution’s allegations are sufficiently strong to 
commit [the accused] for trial.” Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 39 (Jan. 29, 
2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF. 
5 See Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1579080.pdf; Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01-
09-02/11, Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal of the Charges against Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ICC-01-09-
02-11-687.pdf [hereinafter Muthaura Notice]. 
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learning he had fabricated his evidence. It also asked for a delay in 
the start of the trial to consider whether it could sustain its burden at 
trial.6 
On my first day as a prosecutor in the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s Office, my bureau chief, Warren J. Murray Jr., began our 
training by introducing us to a few of his well-known prosecutorial 
maxims or “rules.” Rule number one, his first and most important 
was: “No witness—no case.” He was making the somewhat obvious 
but often forgotten point that the most essential aspect of a 
prosecutor’s work is to identify and secure evidence (most often in 
the form of eyewitness testimony).7 Credible and reliable evidence is 
the foundation of a criminal case; it underlies each and every aspect 
of the case that follows an arrest. Without it, there is no viable case. 
The goal of a criminal investigation is to identify and collect evidence. 
Investigations must be thorough, conducted methodically using 
recognized procedures and methods, and must explore all 
investigative avenues, including those that suggest innocence as well 
as guilt. A successful investigation requires trained and experienced 
staff, a clear investigation plan, and access to where such evidence 
may be located. 
Article 42 of the Rome Statute charges the Office of the 
Prosecutor with the responsibility of receiving and examining 
information of crimes and initiating investigations when appropriate.8 
Articles 53 to 56 set out general principles regarding the conduct of 
investigations. Investigations can be initiated upon the request of a 
State Party or by a referral from the U.N. Security Council exercising 
its Chapter VII authority. OTP can also initiate preliminary 
investigations on its own initiative pursuant to its authority under 
Article 15. 
                                                 
6 See Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, 
Notification of the Removal of a Witness from the Prosecution’s Witness List and 
Application for an Adjournment of the Provisional Trial Date (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1703998.pdf. 
7 In this essay, I will use the word “evidence” to include all types of 
proof accepted in court proceedings, including physical evidence, witness 
testimony, documentary evidence, video, audio, and metadata. 
8 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 42(1). 
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Article 54 sets out the basic structure of an investigation and 
the principles upon which it should proceed. Most notable is 
subsection 1(a) which charges OTP with the duty to investigate “all 
facts” to determine criminal responsibility and to “investigate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.” The ICC Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”) and the Prosecutor’s 
Regulations expound on the conduct of investigations.9 
Most prosecutors learn the vital importance of a good 
investigation early in their career, hopefully with a minor crime. A 
prosecution will not succeed if the investigation underlying it is 
seriously flawed. OTP’s failure to adhere to “rule number one” has 
drawn criticism from the Court and resulted in the faltering of some 
of its prosecutions, and the failing of others. 
THE PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY THE ICC JUDGES 
To date, judges at the ICC have leveled criticism and 
expressed concern with respect to several aspects of the OTP’s 
investigative practices: 
 The failure to adequately discharge the Prosecution’s 
obligation under Article 54 to investigate exculpatory 
information equally. 
 The timing and length of investigations. 
 The quality of the evidence collected during the investigation 
and presented in court. 
 The inappropriate delegation of investigative functions; i.e., 
the use of intermediaries. 
 The failure to properly analyze evidence and disclose 
potentially exculpatory material. 
                                                 
9 Rules 46 to 50 elaborate the Prosecution’s authority under Article 15. 
See INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-
09, (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FFF97111-ECD6-
40B5-9CDA-792BCBE1E695/280253/ICCBD050109ENG.pdf. 
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In the remainder of this essay I will address and analyze each 
of these criticisms in turn. 
A. The Failure to Adequately Discharge the Prosecution’s 
Obligation Under Article 54 to Investigate Exculpatory 
Information Equally 
Defense counsel have regularly asserted that OTP fails to 
conduct its investigations in accordance with Rule 54.10 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber tasked with considering the charges in the Kenya situation 
was troubled by evidence indicating the Prosecution had not met its 
obligation to conduct a fair investigation. The Chamber, in declining 
to confirm the charges against Callixte Mbarushimana in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) situation, expressed its 
concern regarding interview techniques used by investigators which 
“seem[ed] utterly inappropriate when viewed in light of the objective, 
set out in Article 54(1)(a), to establish the truth by ‘investigating 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.’”11 The 
Chamber was concerned with how the transcripts of investigative 
interviews repeatedly demonstrated that the investigators conducting 
the interviews relied heavily on leading questions, belying their theory 
of events, and showing “resentment, impatience or disappointment” 
when witnesses did not provide the answer they had hoped to hear.12 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-
02/09, Confirmation Hearing, T.72 (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc773555.pdf; Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case 
No. ICC-01/09-02/11-728, Decision on Defense Application Pursuant to Article 
64(4) and Related Requests, para. 112 (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585619.pdf [hereinafter Kenyatta Article 64 Decision]. 
11 Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 51 (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1286409.pdf [hereinafter Mbarushimana 
Confirmation Decision]. The Chamber went further to state “[T]he Chamber 
cannot refrain from deprecating such techniques and from highlighting that as a 
consequence, the probative value of evidence obtained by these means may be 
significantly weakened.” 
12 The Chamber noted that the conduct of the investigators was “hardly 
reconcilable with a professional and impartial technique of witness questioning.” Id. 
 2014 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 3:1 
6 
The Chamber noted the objectionable practice in the interviews of 
three witnesses.13 
A witness interview is a process of carefully recording a 
witness’s factual observations, ordinarily through employing open-
ended and non-leading questions.14 The process described by the 
Chamber indicates that investigators may have been suggesting the 
Prosecution’s case theory to witnesses rather than asking neutral 
questions and objectively recording their evidence. This objective 
process should have continued by verifying the veracity of the 
information provided and allowing the case theory to emerge from 
the totality of reliable evidence. Experienced professional 
investigators know that the type of interview described by the 
Chamber should rarely, if ever, be conducted. If a witness is truly 
adverse or is being deceptive, the investigator may decide to conduct 
a second interview to follow-up on the initial non-leading interview 
by confronting the witness with some of the inconsistencies in the 
first interview or with some of the trusted evidence that contradicts 
his or her account.15 If the methods described by the Chamber are 
pervasive, and not simply the work of a few inexperienced 
investigators, OTP must urgently reconsider how it conducts witness 
interviews. 
B. The Timing and Length of Investigations 
Judges have also been concerned with the continuation of 
investigations long after the commencement of proceedings. Some 
defense teams have accused the Prosecution of changing their case 
theory in response to newly acquired witnesses and evidence late into 
the case.16 While the Prosecution must always seek the most reliable 
                                                 
13 Id. (discussing “utterly inappropriate” techniques of the Prosecution’s 
investigators). 
14 For a detailed explanation of the purpose and method of conducting a 
witness interview, see DERMOT GROOME, HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
INVESTIGATION 173-205 (2011). 
15 This two-step approach can also be incorporated in the same interview 
by separating the interview into two parts. 
16 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Francis Muthaura and Uhuru Kenyatta, Case No. 
ICC-01/09-02/11, Corrigendum to Observations on the Conduct, Extent and 
Impact of the Prosecution’s Investigation and Disclosure on the Defence’s Ability 
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evidence and should not ignore important investigative leads, this 
goal must not undermine the right of the accused to know the 
charges against him or her and to prepare a defense. 
The short interval of time spent investigating cases before 
seeking arrest warrants is perhaps one of the causes of this 
phenomenon. The Prosecution’s case theory will inevitably develop 
in response to new evidence and commencing a case on a limited 
understanding of events is likely to result in an evolving theory that 
departs from the original hypothesis. 
Conducting an international criminal investigation is a time 
consuming endeavor. The crimes are both serious and complex and 
require detailed and careful investigation. The investigation of the 
actual crime itself (i.e., the victim, the direct perpetrators, and the 
primary crime scene if available) must be conducted as carefully as, 
and to the same high standards as, those applied by professional 
national police services. Often central to an international criminal 
investigation is the question of whether senior officials participated in 
the crime. These cases require investigators to perform the additional 
task of investigating and determining which officials within the chain 
of command structure bear responsibility. This task adds levels of 
complexity rarely found in domestic crimes. It is a task that requires 
careful study of the legal relationships between senior officials, the 
direct perpetrators, and all those who lie in a chain of causality 
between the two. As such, investigators must conduct a time-
consuming process of accessing and analyzing archival material which 
may shed light on the governmental structures used in the 
commission of the crime. 
International prosecutors also have the burden of establishing 
the contextual or chapeau elements of international crimes. For 
example, establishing that a crime against humanity was perpetrated 
requires that the subject crime was part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population. As such, investigations into 
                                                 
to Prepare for Trial with Confidential Annex A, Public Annex B, Public Annex A1 
(Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1556211.pdf [hereinafter 
Kenyatta Corrigendum]. 
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crimes against humanity require probing into not only the subject 
crime, but also into the other crimes forming the relevant context. 
In addition to these conceptual differences, there are 
significant operational challenges faced by international investigators. 
Witnesses are most often located in places far from The Hague. If 
they are still living in their homes, they are likely to be in a place that 
is insecure and polarized about the work of the investigators. Very 
often victims and witnesses will have fled their permanent residences, 
sometimes seeking refuge in countries far away. Locating these 
witnesses and obtaining permission to interview them from the 
government where they currently reside adds an unavoidable delay to 
the process. 
Before investigators can work effectively they must inform 
themselves about the historical precursors to the conflict as well as 
the culture and practices of the people they will interview. 
Investigators may also be unable to speak the language of the victims 
and witnesses and may need to identify and train competent 
interpreters. 
Before an investigation arrives at its final conclusions, it has 
undergone a cyclical process in which evidence is gathered, verified 
and analyzed, and tentative theories formed, which are in turn tested 
through additional investigation. New evidence is gathered with an 
increased focus, guided by a growing base of verified facts. Nascent 
factual and legal theories may be contradicted, confirmed, or refined 
by successive trips to the field to interview additional witnesses and 
collect more evidence. Over time, the focus of the investigation 
sharpens in a process that is driven by the evidence itself. Eventually 
the credible and reliable evidence excludes all hypotheses but one. At 
this point, additional legal analysis is required to determine whether 
each element of the possible crimes (including contextual elements) 
can be established beyond reasonable doubt. In most cases, it will be 
necessary to conduct further investigation to locate specific evidence 
necessary to corroborate an important witness or to more firmly 
establish a particularly important point. I have supervised numerous 
investigations of international crimes over the course of my career as 
an international prosecutor—each took a minimum of one year. 
 2014 Groome 3:1 
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In light of these challenges, it is surprising that OTP 
requested arrest warrants in the Côte d’Ivoire situation only 22 days 
after commencing the investigation, and only after 74 days in the 
Libya situation.17 While recognizing the importance of interrupting 
ongoing crimes by taking high-level perpetrators into custody, it is 
difficult to imagine even the most rudimentary international 
investigation being completed within these time frames. 
In the Côte d’Ivoire situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber spent 
more time evaluating the evidence than the OTP spent collecting it. 
The Prosecution received authorization to commence an 
investigation on October 3, 2011 and applied for an arrest warrant on 
October 25, 2011. A warrant was issued on November 23, 2011 after 
the Pre-Trial Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that 
Laurent Gbagbo had committed international crimes. Gbagbo 
surrendered to the Court two days later. 
The infirmities of this apparently hurried investigation was 
the subject of scrutiny by the Pre-Trial Chamber considering whether 
to confirm the charges. After a considerable delay, caused in part by a 
defense application asserting that Gbagbo was unfit to stand trial, the 
                                                 
17 In the Côte d’Ivoire situation, OTP opened its investigation on 
October 3, 2011 and requested an arrest warrant on October 25, 2011. In the Libya 
situation, OTP opened its investigation on March 3, 2011 and requested an arrest 
warrant on May 16, 2011. See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11, 
Warrant of Arrest for Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, paras. 2-3 (Nov. 23. 2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1276751.pdf; Prosecutor v. Muammar 
Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11/11-1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application 
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi and Abdulla Alsenussi, para. 3 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099314.pdf. 
  In fairness to the Prosecution, there are indications that it was 
receiving information and conducting preliminary inquiries in the Côte d’Ivoire 
situation as early as April 2009. See Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor of the Int’l 
Criminal Court, Statement on an Overview of Situations and Cases Before the ICC 
(Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/CF9DFD80-5E15-4AA8-
BA0D-7E728F0D86DF/280265/140409Capetown.pdf. See also Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, ICC Prosecutor’s Speech to the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States 
Parties (Nov. 18, 2009),  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-
statements-OTP-ENG.pdf. 
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confirmation hearing was held in February 2013. The legal standard 
for confirming charges against an accused is somewhat elevated from 
the “reasonable grounds” standard for an arrest warrant, but still well 
below the standard of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” at trial. 
Article 61(7) of the Rome Statute requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
determine “whether there is sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the 
crimes charged.”18 This standard serves a gate-keeping function, 
ensuring that only those charges which merit a full trial are allowed to 
proceed to one. Article 61(7) gives a pre-trial chamber three options: 
a) to confirm the charges; b) to decline to confirm the charges; or c) 
to adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecution to provide 
additional evidence or amend the charges.19 
The Chamber, having assessed the evidence, came to the view 
that the Prosecution’s case was insufficient to meet the substantial 
grounds test. It reasoned that although the evidence was insufficient 
it did not “appear to be so lacking in relevance and probative value 
that it leaves the Chamber with no choice but to decline to confirm 
the charges under Article 67(7)(b).” The Chamber decided that the 
proper course of action was to adjourn the case and request that the 
Prosecution conduct more detailed investigations.20 The Chamber 
could “not exclude that the Prosecutor might be able to present or 
collect further evidence and is therefore, out of fairness, prepared to 
                                                 
18 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 3. See supra note 4, for the 
definition of “substantial grounds” articulated in Lubanga. The Appeals Chamber 
has stated that, in the application of this standard, a “Pre-Trial Chamber may 
evaluate ambiguities, inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence or doubts 
as to the credibility of witnesses.” Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. 
ICC-01.04-01/10 OA 4, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 Dec. 2011 entitled “Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges” (Mar. 3, 2012).  
19 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 61(7). 
20 The Chamber in applying the gate-keeping threshold of Article 61(7) 
considered that the Prosecution must have presented its strongest case resulting 
from a largely completed investigation. Thus, the appropriate course of action was 
to adjourn the case for additional investigations. Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, 
supra note 3, at para. 25.  
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give her a limited amount of additional time to do so.”21 The 
Chamber enumerated the avenues of investigation the Prosecution 
should pursue.22 The Chamber gave the Prosecution five months to 
continue its investigation and present a new Document Containing 
the Charges (DCC).23 
It is clear that OTP’s practice of initiating criminal 
proceedings prior to substantially completing its investigation has 
resulted in extensive investigations continuing after an arrest warrant 
was requested, and, in some cases, after the confirmation of the 
charges. In Mbarushimana, the Chamber criticized the Prosecution’s 
broad language in the DCC, which, when specifying the location of 
crimes used the language “include but are not limited to . . . .”24 The 
Chamber expressed its concern that this was an attempt by the 
Prosecution to keep open the possibility of broadening the case 
should additional evidence become available later as a result of 
continued investigations. The Chamber assessed the phrase as 
meaningless.25 
The Defense in Kenyatta recently took issue with the large 
number of new witnesses that were identified by the Prosecution 
after the confirmation hearing, asserting that they resulted in 
                                                 
21 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 3, at para. 37. The 
Chamber went on to find that giving the Prosecution this opportunity did not 
unduly infringe on Gbagbo’s right to be tried without due delay. 
22 Regulation 35 of the Prosecutor’s Regulations requires a series of 
planning documents before investigative activities commence. These planning 
documents, taken together, would form a comprehensive investigation plan. 
23 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 3, at para. 23. It is 
important to note that one member of the Pre-Trial Chamber I wrote an articulate 
and persuasive dissent from the majority’s decision. Judge Silvia Fernández de 
Gurmendi took the view that the majority’s decision was based on an erroneous 
understanding of the applicable evidentiary standard for the confirmation of 
charges. She went further to take issue with the Chamber’s application of the 
evidentiary standard to the contextual elements of crimes against humanity. Finally, 
Judge Gurmendi found that the majority’s request to the Prosecution to deal with 
specific “questions” and “issues” was both irrelevant and inappropriate. 
24 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, supra note 11, at paras. 82-83. 
25 Id. at paras. 79-83. 
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“radically altered” allegations.26 The Chamber in large part rejected 
this assertion and reaffirmed that the Prosecution was not required to 
rely on the same evidence at trial that it had adduced during the 
confirmation process.27 Nevertheless, the Chamber expressed its 
concern regarding the “substantial volume of new evidence that was 
gathered by the Prosecution [after confirmation].”28 The Chamber, 
citing the Mbarushimana Appeal Decision, reminded the Prosecution 
that the investigation should be largely completed by the time of the 
confirmation hearing.29 Judge Van den Wyngaert, in her concurring 
opinion, was particularly troubled by the large number of witnesses 
who were identified as such only after the confirmation hearing. She 
stated that “there are serious questions as to whether the Prosecution 
conducted a full and thorough investigation of the case against the 
accused prior to confirmation.”30 The Kenyatta Chamber introduced 
the legal requirement that all investigations that could have 
reasonably been completed before confirmation must be. The 
Chamber went further stating that the defense will have remedies 
available with respect to failures to do this.31 It remains to be seen 
whether the unspecified remedies referred to by the Kenyatta 
                                                 
26 Kenyatta Corrigendum, supra note 16, at para. 11 (“The nature of the 
Prosecution’s ongoing and protracted investigation and the manner in which the 
Prosecution has sought to disclose its evidence have required the Defense to 
expend considerable investigative resources in order to attempt to deal with an 
ever-shifting case…”). 
27 Kenyatta Article 64 Decision, supra note 10, at paras. 110-11. 
28 Id. at para. 112. 
29 Id. at para. 119 (“The Prosecution should not seek to have the charges 
against a suspect confirmed before having conducted a full and thorough 
investigation in order to have a sufficient overview of the evidence available and 
the theory of the case.”). 
30 Id. at Anx 2, para. 1 (Van den Wyngaert, J., concurring). 
31 See Kenyatta Article 64 Decision, supra note 10, at para. 121. However, 
the Majority is of the view that the Prosecution should not continue investigating 
post-confirmation for the purpose of collecting evidence which it could reasonably 
have been expected to have collected prior to confirmation. If a Trial Chamber 
finds that this has occurred, it would need to determine the appropriate remedy 
based on the circumstances of the case. 
  Although the Chamber does not limit the application of this principle 
to inculpatory evidence, that is likely what it intended. It would be inconsistent with 
general principles of justice and fairness for the Prosecution’s obligations under 
Article 54 to cease upon the confirmation of charges. 
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Chamber will have the teeth to compel a change in the OTP’s 
investigative practices, but the Prosecutor is certainly on notice that 
in the future Chambers are likely to be less forgiving when 
investigations prove to be inadequate or tardy. 
While the concerns addressed by the Kenyatta Chamber 
focused on the procedural unfairness caused by an investigation that 
continues after confirmation, a failure to adequately investigate a case 
before commencing a criminal process risks a case that is flawed and 
that may ultimately have to be withdrawn. 
This precise situation arose for Kenyatta’s co-defendant, 
Francis Muthaura, for whom charges were also confirmed in January 
2012. On March 11, 2013, OTP filed a notice withdrawing all charges 
against Muthaura.32 In the filing, OTP informed the Chamber that 
having considered all of the available evidence, “there is no 
reasonable prospect of conviction in the case.”33 When explaining the 
underlying reasons for the withdrawal, the Prosecution pointed to the 
fact that several witnesses had died, were killed or had become 
uncooperative.34 It informed the Chamber that one witness recanted 
his testimony after receiving bribes from representatives of the 
accused.35 It is difficult to assess the extent to which these problems 
were foreseeable and could have been overcome by identifying 
additional witnesses and evidence during the investigation. 
One clearly troubling aspect of the Prosecution’s submission 
is its explanation that one reason the case collapsed was that the 
Kenyan government “failed to assist it in uncovering evidence that 
would have been crucial.”36 This suggests that the Prosecution may 
                                                 
32 Muthaura Notice, supra note 5. The Statute and Rules are silent on 
whether the Prosecution can withdraw charges without leave during the interval 
between the confirmation of charges and the start of trial. On March 18, 2013, the 
Trial Chamber decided that the leave of the Chamber was required and granted the 
Prosecution permission to withdraw the charges. 
33 Id. at para. 9. 
34 Id. at para. 11. 
35 To date, there has been no public record of Article 70 proceedings 
(Offenses Against the Administration of Justice) having been instituted against the 
person who allegedly bribed the witness. 
36 Muthaura Notice, supra note 5, at para. 11. 
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have known at the time of confirmation that it had insufficient 
evidence for conviction, but proceeded in the hope that such 
evidence would come into its possession before the start of trial.37 
Many national jurisdictions charge the prosecutor with the 
responsibility of assessing the probability of conviction on the 
evidence in its possession prior to committing significant public 
resources to a prosecution.38 This requirement not only minimizes 
                                                 
37 Id. The Prosecution had acknowledged in a public statement that there 
were ongoing efforts to undermine its work in Kenya. See Fatou Bensouda, ICC 
Prosecutor, Statement on ICC Witnesses Undergo Rigorous Tests (Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/85B705E7-5E3A-43C0-A473-
7B52CA120951/282930/Kenya.pdf. In a related case, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul 
pointed out the significant risks that are occasioned by such an incremental 
investigation: 
[S]uch an approach, as tempting as it might be for the 
Prosecutor, would be risky, if not irresponsible: if after the 
confirmation of the charges it turns out as impossible to gather 
further evidence to attain the decisive threshold of “beyond 
reasonable doubt,” the case in question may become very 
difficult or may eventually collapse at trial, and then with many 
serious consequences, including for the entire Court and the 
victims who have placed great hopes in this institution. 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto et al., Case No. 01/09-01/11, Decision on 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to art. 67(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 
para. 47 (Jan. 23, 2012) (Kaul, J., dissenting), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314535.pdf. 
38 See, e.g., PROSECUTION POLICY OF THE COMMONWEALTH: 
GUIDELINES FOR MAKING DECISIONS IN THE PROSECUTION PROCESS § 2.5, 
(Austl.) 
http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy/ProsecutionPolicy.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
When deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the 
institution or continuation of a prosecution the existence of a 
bare prima facie case is not sufficient to justify the 
prosecution. . . .[I]t is then necessary to give consideration to the 
prospects of conviction. A prosecution should not proceed if 
there is no reasonable prospect of a conviction being secured. 
See also NAT’L DIST. ATT’Y ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 53 (3d 
ed.), 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20
Commentary.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
While commencing a prosecution is permitted by most ethical 
standards upon a determination that probable cause exists to 
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the waste of public resources on prosecutions that are unlikely to 
result in convictions, but also protects those accused from facing the 
jeopardy of a trial based on flimsy evidence. Given the significant 
resources implicated by an international criminal case and the 
jeopardy it places upon an accused, a decision to proceed in the 
hopes of acquiring “crucial” evidence demonstrates poor 
prosecutorial judgment. 
In both the Libya and Côte d’Ivoire situations there were 
legitimate international interests in conducting expedient 
investigations and securing the arrest of men believed to be still 
perpetrating crimes. Using the ICC as a means of interrupting 
ongoing crimes brings with it the risk that hastily investigated and 
constructed cases will ultimately fail. 
International criminal investigations in conflict areas are 
unique in that evidence that was unavailable at the start of the 
investigation may become available as time passes and the conflict 
subsides. Changes in security, disposition towards the court, and 
reaction to court proceedings can all prompt new witnesses to come 
forward. Over the course of a case there may be better access to 
witnesses, crime scenes, and archives.39 Although the Prosecution 
must always seek the most reliable and probative evidence, this goal 
must be balanced against the accused’s right to know the case against 
him and to prepare a defense. 
                                                 
believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant 
has committed it, th[is] standard prescribes a higher standard for 
filing a criminal charge. To suggest that the charging standard 
should be the prosecutor’s reasonable belief that the charges can 
be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial is recognition of 
the powerful effects of the initiation of criminal charges. 
Pursuant to the prosecution’s duty to seek justice, the protection 
of the rights of all (even the prospective defendant) is required.  
39 During the trial of Slobodan Miloševič, it was a frequent occurrence 
for previously unknown witnesses to come forward and identify themselves in the 
ICTY’s field offices in response to something they saw in the broadcast of the trial. 
See Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice 
Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323 (2009). 
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ICTY judges have developed criteria to help strike the 
appropriate balance between these competing concerns whenever the 
Prosecution seeks to add evidence after it has filed its witness and 
exhibit lists. These criteria include: 
 The relevance and importance of the new evidence; 
 Whether there is good cause for the late addition of the 
evidence; 
 Whether the Prosecution exercised due diligence in 
identifying the new evidence; and 
 Whether allowing the use of the new evidence will result in 
prejudice to the accused. 
Trial Chambers consider and balance these factors to 
determine whether the interests of justice are best served by the 
either allowing or disallowing the new evidence.40 
Judges are correct in imposing a standard requiring that the 
investigation ordinarily be substantially complete before the 
confirmation of the charges. If substantial investigations continue, 
the Prosecution should have the obligation of explaining why the 
evidence was previously unknown or unavailable, and the burden of 
establishing that the interests of justice are best served by permitting 
the use of the new evidence. 
                                                 
40 See Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-
03-69-T, Decision on Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Prosecution Motions for 
Leave to Amend its Rule 65ter Exhibit List (Feb. 10, 2010), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/100210.pdf; Prosecutor 
v. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-09-91-T, Decision Granting in 
Part Mićo Stanišić’s Motion for Leave to Amend his Rule 65ter Exhibit List (July 
19, 2011), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tdec/en/110719.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Defense Motion 
to Amend 65ter List and Second Bar Table (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/101201a.pdf.  
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C. The Quality of the Evidence Collected During the Investigation 
and Presented in Court 
Commencing a prosecution before completing a 
comprehensive investigation directly impacts the quantum and quality 
of the evidence available to a chamber. One of the criticisms of the 
Gbagbo Chamber was the Prosecution’s heavy reliance on anonymous 
hearsay. Criticisms noted the lower probative value of such evidence 
as well as the implications for the right of an accused to know who is 
providing evidence against him or her.41 The Chamber also took issue 
with the Prosecution’s reliance on documentary and summary 
evidence, such as press articles and reports from non-governmental 
organizations, and noted that unless the Prosecution was to conduct 
additional investigations there was little prospect of the evidence 
being accepted at trial.42 The Chamber expressed its “serious 
concern” about the quality of the evidence presented during the 
confirmation hearing.43 
The Mbarushimana Chamber also indicated that the 
anonymous hearsay evidence contained in Human Rights Watch 
reports would, as a general rule, be “given a low probative value.”44 
The Garda Chamber followed a similar approach with respect to 
                                                 
41 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67 (addressing Rights of the 
Accused). 
42 The Gbagbo Chamber stated: “In light of the above considerations, the 
Chamber notes with serious concern that in this case the Prosecution relied heavily 
on NGO reports and press articles with regard to key elements of the case, 
including the contextual elements of crimes against humanity.” Gbagbo 
Adjournment Decision, supra note 3, at para. 35. 
43 Id. at para. 35. In addition to the four separate incidents charged by the 
Prosecution, it also relied on 41 other incidents to establish the contextual or 
chapeau elements of crimes against humanity. The Chamber found that for the 
majority of these 45 incidents, the only evidence adduced during the confirmation 
hearing was anonymous hearsay from NGO reports, U.N. reports, and press 
articles. 
44 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, supra note 11, at para. 78. This 
is in keeping with law in many national courts, which are reluctant to find probable 
or reasonable cause based on anonymous information alone. See, e.g., Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
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anonymous evidence and summary statements that the Prosecution 
tendered in support of its case.45 
Anonymous hearsay can be of great assistance in the early 
stages of an investigation by providing important leads to identify 
witnesses and evidence as well as providing background to orient 
investigators to the context and nature of the crimes. Many of the 
investigations at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) were commenced after a review of reports from 
the media and non-governmental human rights organizations.46 The 
ICTY also had the benefit of the Bassiouni Commission, an ad hoc 
commission established by the U.N. Security Council to conduct 
preliminary non-judicial investigations into some of the allegations of 
crimes that occurred during the breakup of Yugoslavia.47 
By contrast, anonymous hearsay should rarely, if ever, be 
adduced as proof to sustain the Prosecutor’s burden at any stage of a 
criminal proceeding. It inherently lacks sufficient reliability and is 
very often factually inaccurate. Many international crimes occur 
during conflicts in which propaganda is a frequently used tool by all 
sides. In the context of the former Yugoslavia, a great many fantastic 
and false stories were spread anonymously in an effort to cause 
                                                 
45 Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Public Redacted Version), para. 52 (Feb. 
8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc819602.pdf [hereinafter Garda 
Confirmation Decision]. 
46 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOOKING FOR JUSTICE: WAR 
CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA (vol. I 1992); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR 
CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA: BOSANSKI SAMAC, SIX WAR CRIMINALS 
NAMED BY VICTIMS (1994), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1994/bosnia/; 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT WAR CRIMES IN RACAK 
(1999). See also AMNESTY INT’L, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: “TO BURY MY 
BROTHERS’ BONES” (1996), 
 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR63/015/1996/en/8a8a95e2-eaf8-
11dd-aad1-ed57e7e5470b/eur630151996en.pdf.  
47 Comm’n of Experts’ Final Report, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 
1994), 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994
_en.pdf. 
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panic.48 The anonymity of the information also makes it impossible 
for a chamber to assess the credibility and reliability of the person 
providing the information. OTP’s heavy reliance on anonymous 
hearsay deprived pre-trial chambers of the ability to check the 
information against other known sources. A chamber that must 
evaluate evidence that is predominantly anonymous is unable to 
cross-check the evidence because it is difficult to assess whether 
seemingly corroborative evidence is truly corroborative, or simply 
another formulation of the same information from the same 
anonymous source. 
A competent investigation requires more than aggregating 
several sources of such hearsay and presenting it to the court. 
Investigators must find the source of the hearsay and conduct their 
own independent interview and assessment of the witness. 
Equally important is the necessity of investigating the 
credibility and reliability of known witnesses.49 Ultimately, a chamber 
will consider the evidence they provide in light of its assessment of 
that witness’s credibility and reliability. Many of the problems that 
occurred over the course of the Lubanga trial were the result of the 
Prosecution’s failure to verify the information provided by 
witnesses.50 An important part of any comprehensive witness 
                                                 
48 One of the more egregious reports intended to enflame passions that 
was proven to be false was a claim that Serb babies were being fed to the lions in 
the Sarajevo zoo. The original broadcast by Rada Djokić can be seen on Youtube at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LzUqQxNb8qw. Borislav Herak, one of the 
early infamous perpetrators of crimes in the Sarajevo area, claimed that he was 
motivated in part by the reports of Serb babies being fed to the lions at the zoo. 
Politics of Rape: Brutal, degrading act a powerful weapon in violence that rends former 
Yugoslavia, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 5, 1993, available at 1993 WLNR 
4848763. 
49 Credibility is whether a witness is being honest and telling the “truth.” 
Reliability is whether the facts described by a witness are accurate. This is an 
important distinction in the case of a witness who is honestly mistaken. For 
example, a witness may be honestly mistaken in their identification of a perpetrator. 
In such a case, the witness is credible but unreliable. 
50 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, para. 483 (Mar. 14 2012), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga 
Judgment]. The Chamber in referring to the evidence of nine witnesses who 
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interview is to gather information that can assist a chamber in 
evaluating the witness’ credibility and reliability.51 
In addition to the poor quality of some evidence, ICC judges 
have expressed concern over the paucity or complete lack of 
evidence on important aspects of the Prosecution’s case. For 
example, the Gbagbo Chamber found that the Prosecution’s evidence 
left an “incomplete picture” with respect to the structural links 
between Gbagbo and the “Pro-Gbagbo Forces” which committed 
the crimes.52 There was insufficient evidence to support the 
Prosecution’s inferences with respect to the asserted liability that 
flowed from the direct perpetrators, to Gbagbo’s inner circle, and to 
Gbagbo himself.53 
In the Lubanga Judgment, the Chamber was critical of the 
Prosecution’s failure to adequately investigate the age of alleged child 
soldiers—something of central importance to the case.54 Similar 
criticisms were echoed in Ngudjolo, another case from the DRC. 
Despite the fact that the Ngudjolo Chamber recognized that the 
Prosecution faced significant challenges in conducting investigations 
in the DRC, it chided the Prosecution for its failure to adequately 
investigate the background of key witnesses.55 
Evidence presented by the Prosecution in Mbarushimana was 
also found to be lacking. The Chamber declined to confirm the 
                                                 
claimed to have been conscripted as children, “[t]he prosecution’s negligence in 
failing to verify and scrutinize this material sufficiently before it was introduced led 
to significant expenditure on the part of the Court.” 
51 HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 14, at 
190-96.  
52 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 3, at para. 36. The 
Chamber also noted the lack of evidence regarding the activities of the opposing 
forces, something it considered relevant to its inquiry. 
53 Id. at para. 36. 
54 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at para. 175 (“Whilst acknowledging 
the difficult circumstances in the field at the time of the investigation, this failure to 
investigate the children’s histories has significantly undermined some of the 
evidence called by the Prosecution.”). 
55 Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, para. 121 (Dec. 18 2012) 
[hereinafter Ngudjolo Judgment]. 
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charges relating to alleged attacks in three villages, finding the 
evidence related to them to be sparse, inconsistent and insufficient to 
sustain the charges.56 In some cases, the only evidence offered in 
support of an alleged attack was U.N. reports containing vague 
summaries of the events.57 In Garda, the Chamber characterized the 
Prosecution’s evidence regarding some allegations as “scant and 
unreliable.”58 The Chamber remarked that in some cases the evidence 
adduced not only failed to support the Prosecution’s allegations, but 
instead supported the accused’s contention that he did not participate 
in the alleged attacks.59 The Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s 
arguments and declined to confirm the charges against Garda.60 
The Prosecution must give greater focus to the quantum and 
quality of evidence it is producing before the court. Consideration 
should be given to each element of the crimes charged ensuring that 
the Prosecution can confidentially meet its burden at each stage of 
the criminal process. 
D. The Inappropriate Delegation of Investigative Functions 
While the reliance on NGO reports has been criticized as an 
improper delegation of a prosecutorial function, the use of 
intermediaries has caused considerable debate over the 
appropriateness of employing external intermediaries to perform key 
investigative functions. This issue came dramatically to the fore when 
the first witness in the Lubanga case returned after the lunch break 
and recanted his earlier testimony that he had been abducted on the 
way home from school and conscripted into the Union of Congolese 
Patriots (UPC).61 His recantation cast immediate suspicion on those 
involved in bringing him forward as a witness. 
                                                 
56 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision, supra note 11, at para. 120. 
57 Id. at para. 120. 
58 Garda Confirmation Decision, supra note 45, at para. 179. 
59 Id. at para. 228. 
60 Id. at para. 236. 
61 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, para. 7 (May 31, 2010) http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc881407.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga Intermediary Decision]. 
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In Lubanga, the Prosecution employed people to assist it in 
identifying and interviewing witnesses. An OTP investigator 
identified as P-583 gave evidence at trial that the use of 
intermediaries was deemed to be the only way to gain access to 
knowledgeable witnesses given the security situation that existed at 
the time and the fact that OTP does not have its own police force.62 
The Prosecution relied on seven different intermediaries to secure the 
evidence of approximately half of the witnesses it called at trial.63 
The integrity of the intermediaries and the role they played in 
the investigation was a central issue at trial. The Defense brought a 
motion at trial seeking a permanent stay of the proceedings based on 
alleged misconduct of these intermediaries. The Chamber denied the 
motion finding that it would be able to reach final conclusions 
regarding the intermediaries and their impact on the integrity of the 
case during the trial.64 
In its final judgment, the Chamber focused on the conduct of 
four of the seven intermediaries and set out its detailed analysis of 
each of them. Intermediary 143 (I-143) was a paid intermediary who 
introduced the Prosecution to 21 witnesses and another intermediary 
(P-031). Five of these witnesses were called at trial. The Defense 
argued that the witnesses were suborned by I-143.65 The Chamber 
found that inconsistent statements by witnesses P-007, P-008, P-010 
and P-011 as well as evidence that contradicted their evidence, 
rendered the witnesses unreliable. The Chamber further concluded 
that its findings reflected negatively on the integrity of I-143 and 
established that “it is likely that as the common point of contact he 
                                                 
62 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at paras. 167, 181. For a detailed 
description of the investigation and the problems it encountered, see Lubanga 
Judgment, supra note 50, at paras. 124-77. 
63 The Prosecution informed the Chamber that it had relied on a total of 
23 individuals and organizations in its investigation. See Lubanga Intermediary 
Decision, supra note 61, para. 3. 
64 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Redacted Decision on the “Defense Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the 
Proceedings,” para. 198 (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2011.03.07_Prosecutor_v_Luba
nga2.pdf. 
65 Lubanga Intermediary Decision, supra note 61, at para. 16. 
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[I-143] persuaded, encouraged or assisted some or all of them [the 
witnesses] to give false testimony.”66 
Intermediary 316 (I-316) was under contract with OTP, even 
though the Prosecution was aware of his close ties with the 
Congolese intelligence service.67 The Chamber noted with particular 
concern that OTP employed an intermediary who was employed by 
the very same government that had originally referred the case to the 
ICC.68 I-316 not only introduced OTP staff to witnesses but also 
helped arrange interviews. The Chamber considered that it was 
inappropriate for someone who lacked both independence and 
impartiality to essentially become a member of the prosecution 
team.69 The Chamber was sufficiently concerned with the integrity of 
I-316 and his impact on the case that it instructed the Prosecution to 
produce him as a witness.70 The Chamber found him incredible, 
citing among other things his claim that his assistant (“Individual 
183”) and his family had been murdered, when in fact the 
Prosecution conceded that his assistant was still alive.71 The Chamber 
concluded that I-316 had “persuaded witnesses to lie” and dismissed 
the entirety of the testimony of one witness (P-015) and some of the 
testimony of another (P-038).72 
P-321 was another paid intermediary who acted on behalf of 
OTP for more than a year and introduced investigators to eight 
witnesses, four of whom testified in the Lubanga trial. The Chamber 
found that all four of these witnesses gave materially false evidence 
and that there was a “significant possibility” that P-321’s improper 
influence over the witnesses was the cause.73 
                                                 
66 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at para. 291. 
67 In addition, the Chamber noted that at least one other member of the 
Congolese intelligence assisted I-316 in his work. Id. at para. 368. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at paras. 369-74. 
72 Id. at para. 374. 
73 Id. at para. 450. 
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P-031 was recruited as an intermediary with the assistance of 
I-143 and worked for OTP between 2005 and 2008.74 The Chamber 
found that while the evidence before it was insufficient to conclude 
that P-031 had persuaded witnesses to give false testimony, it found 
the evidence sufficient to require caution with respect to the evidence 
of witnesses who had contact with him.75 
The Chamber concluded that “the Prosecution should not 
have delegated its investigative responsibilities to the intermediaries 
. . .notwithstanding the extensive security difficulties it faced.”76 The 
Chamber criticized the Prosecution’s reliance on these intermediaries 
and that it had permitted them to work with important witnesses 
essentially unsupervised. The Chamber further noted the significant 
time it expended to scrutinize this practice and the evidence it 
yielded.77 The Chamber used the judgment to inform the Prosecution 
that at least two of the intermediaries may have committed Crimes 
Against the Administration of Justice under Article 70 of the Rome 
Statute and reminded the Prosecution of its obligation to initiate an 
investigation into the matter.78 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Chamber ultimately 
concluded that children were recruited and conscripted into the 
UPC/FPLC79 and deployed in hostile actions based on other credible 
testimonial and documentary evidence.80 
The Chamber is correct in its criticism of OTP’s use of 
intermediaries. Their functional role in the investigation went far 
beyond helping investigators contact potential witnesses. They 
became paid agents of OTP, to whom the Prosecution delegated 
important investigative functions. Using intermediaries to make initial 
                                                 
74 Id. at para. 453. 
75 Id. at para. 477. 
76 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 50, at para. 482. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at para. 483. At the time this article was written, there was no public 
record that such an investigation had been undertaken. 
79 The FPLC is the French acronym for the Patriotic Force for the 
Liberation of the Congo, the military wing of the Union of Congolese Patriots 
(UPC).  
80 Id. at paras. 911-16. 
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contact with witnesses is an acceptable way of working in a hostile 
environment. In some situations making direct contact with witnesses 
may jeopardize their safety and give the impression that investigators 
are unprofessional and insensitive to their security. However, the 
intermediary should only be used to convey a request to speak with a 
potential witness and not in the selection of witnesses themselves.81 
They should not be involved in any interviews or exchange of 
substantive evidential information between the investigators and 
witnesses. If intermediaries are to be used, the investigator must 
carefully consider whom to use. Knowingly employing an intelligence 
operative to act as an intermediary, particularly in the setting of the 
Lubanga case, was fraught with danger from the outset. The 
Prosecution has the responsibility to control all aspects of the 
investigation and vigorously protect its integrity. 
Even if the use of intermediaries to identify and interview 
potential child soldiers was necessary in Lubanga, the Prosecution 
does not appear to have taken the steps necessary to verify the 
information gathered in this way. Investigators with the Lubanga 
Defense obtained and tendered school and other records, which 
established that some of the Prosecution witnesses claiming to have 
been child soldiers were too old for this to be true. Given that the age 
of a victim/witness at the time he or she was inducted into combat 
was a central issue in the trial, the Prosecution had an important 
responsibility to independently verify the age of these witnesses 
before advancing their evidence in court. Had the Prosecution done 
so, the true age of the victims would have been apparent and many of 
the problems during the proceedings would have been avoided. 
E. The Failure to Properly Analyze Evidence and Disclose 
Potentially Exculpatory Material 
The handling of evidence gathered during the investigation 
has also been an issue to the extent that it has had implications for 
OTP’s proper discharge of its disclosure obligations. During its 
investigation into the situation in Kenya, the Prosecution sought and 
                                                 
81 In Lubanga, it is reasonably possible that paid intermediaries whose job 
it was to locate witnesses would have considered that payment would cease unless 
they continued to “find witnesses.” 
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received documents from a provider under the condition that they 
would not be disclosed. After the Lubanga confirmation hearing, the 
Prosecution recognized that some of this material required disclosure 
under Article 67(2).82 Proceedings came to an abrupt halt when the 
Prosecution initially failed to receive permission to disclose the 
material. The Trial Chamber found that during the course of its 
investigations, 
[T]he Prosecution has incorrectly used Article 54(3)(e) 
[confidentiality agreements] when entering into 
agreements with information-providers, with the 
consequence that a significant body of exculpatory 
evidence which would otherwise have been disclosed 
to the accused is to be withheld from him, thereby 
improperly inhibiting the opportunities for the 
accused to prepare his defense . . . .83 
The Chamber further found that the Prosecution’s actions 
had also effectively prevented the Chamber from being able to review 
the material and determine whether the non-disclosure of the 
material would constitute a breach of the accused’s right to a fair 
trial.84 The Prosecution’s error of accepting exculpatory material on 
the condition that it would not be disclosed nearly resulted in a 
termination of the ICC’s first trial. The trial was only able to continue 
                                                 
82 Article 67(2) provides in relevant part: 
[T]he Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the 
defense evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control 
which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence 
of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which 
may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. 
83 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Urgent Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials 
Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the 
Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008, para. 92 (June 13, 2008), 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICC/Stay_the_Proceedings.html. 
84 Id. 
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after the conditions of the original agreement with the provider were 
re-negotiated.85 
In Kenyatta, there is also evidence to suggest that, at least in 
one instance, the Prosecution was unaware of all of the evidence 
generated during the investigation, including clearly exculpatory 
material. In that case, the credibility of Witness 4, a witness originally 
deemed of great significance, was undermined when the Prosecution 
disclosed an affidavit containing a contradictory account of his 
evidence.86 Due to an oversight, the affidavit was not disclosed to the 
defense prior to the confirmation hearing.87 The Defense alleged that 
the Prosecution acted in bad faith and characterized the disclosure 
breach as a “clear and systematic failure involving senior Prosecution 
lawyers with respect to the procedures applied during its 
investigations.”88 
While the Chamber rejected the defense assertion of bad 
faith, it did express its “serious concern” with respect to the failure to 
disclose the affidavit and the “deficiencies in the Prosecution’s 
internal structure.”89 In her concurring opinion, Judge Van den 
Wyngaert accused the Prosecution of being negligent with respect to 
its responsibility to verify the trustworthiness of its evidence.90 
                                                 
85 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
1644, Reasons for Oral Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings, para. 10 (Jan. 23 
2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc622878.pdf. 
86 Kenyatta Article 64 Decision, supra note 10, at paras. 24-31. 
87 Id. at paras. 24-26. 
88 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted 
Version of the “Defense Reply to the Confidential Redacted Version of the 25 
February 2013 Consolidated Prosecution Response to the Defense applications 
under Article 64 of the Statute to Refer the Confirmation Decision back to the Pre-
Trial Chamber”, para. 29 (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1565107.pdf. The Defense asserts that in good 
investigative practice would have required that the statement in question be 
reviewed: i) upon receipt, ii) prior to the re-interview, iii) prior to making oral 
submissions at the confirmation hearing.  
89 Kenyatta Article 64 Decision, supra note 10, at para. 94-95. 
90 Id. at Anx 2 paras. 3-4 (Van den Wyngaert, J., concurring). 
[T]here can be no excuse for the Prosecution’s negligent attitude 
towards verifying the trustworthiness of its evidence. [. . .] 
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International criminal investigations often involve many 
investigators and analysts working on different aspects of the 
investigation. Systems must be put in place to ensure that the 
evidence gathered is organized and referenced in a way that allows 
the investigative team to easily access all relevant information related 
to individual witnesses. Equally, prosecutors and investigators must 
be extremely careful when entering into confidentiality agreements 
under Rule 54(e). It is difficult to make a decision about the risks 
involved when entering a confidentiality agreement during the course 
of the investigation. The legal obligation to disclose potentially 
exculpatory evidence is a broad one. Entering into confidentiality 
agreements carry a high risk of the problems experienced in Lubanga. 
Ideally, OTP should include a clause in all agreements that should 
potentially exculpatory material be found, the Prosecution is 
authorized to submit it for an ex parte review by a chamber and a 
commitment from the provider to abide by a chamber’s decision on 
whether such material should be disclosed to the defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The competency and integrity of investigations conducted by 
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC have been called into 
question in several of its cases. The criticisms are valid and should be 
carefully considered by the Prosecution. The cornerstone of every 
criminal prosecution is the quality and integrity of the investigation 
underlying it. OTP must ensure that it has competent, professionally 
trained staff who conduct its investigations according to generally 
accepted principles and in keeping with all of the requirements of the 
Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence. A failure to 
improve the quality of ICC investigations and to take measures to 
ensure investigations are concluded earlier in the process risks not 
                                                 
[T]here are grave problems in the Prosecution’s system of 
evidence review, as well as a serious lack of proper oversight by 
senior Prosecution staff. Clearly, thorough and comprehensive 
due diligence with regard to the reliability of the available 
evidence is an ongoing obligation of the Prosecution under 
article 54(1)(a), which is as important as the collection of that 
evidence itself. 
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only continued criticism in individual cases but risks undermining the 
credibility of the Office of the Prosecutor and the ICC itself. 
The maxim of that seasoned Manhattan prosecutor, “No 
witness—no case” reminds prosecutors of the fundamental 
importance of conducting an effective investigation and gathering 
credible and reliable evidence in a process that is fair. This important 
lesson is as true for those who prosecute crimes against humanity as 
it is for those who prosecute misdemeanors. 
 
